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Legal Education in Pakistan: The
Domination of Practitioners and the
“Critically Endangered” Academic
Osama Siddique
In any discussion of the general state of legal education in Pakistan, the
role of lawyers merits special attention. According to one estimate, Pakistan
has 74 law colleges affiliated with 16 universities.1 Historically underfunded
and ignored, state law schools in Pakistan never have developed a favorable
environment for a quality local research to flourish. At the same time, private
law schools that emerged a few decades ago have largely pursued profit and
done little to raise the quality of legal education. Finally, the general society
never really has experienced and as a result has not learned to value what
legal academics and scholars do. “Law teacher” is the closest attempt by most
judges, lawyers and the public at large to describe the phenomenon. While the
absence of a legal academy has resulted in negligible improvement of teaching
and research standards, it also has impoverished the larger national discourse
on law, rights and justice. Few and far between to start with, legal academics
in Pakistan—employing the parlance of life sciences—are now a “critically
endangered” species that may soon even be “extinct in the wild.” Therefore,
chance and increasingly rare sightings in the rarefied atmosphere of a sundry
conference may be the only way to observe one—if a complete “extinction”
does not occur. This is a brief discussion of how this state of affairs came about.
Conflicting Regulatory Jurisdictions and the Domination of Lawyers
Teaching at Pakistani law schools primarily is undertaken by practicing
lawyers, as well as retired lawyers and judges. Lawyers also have assumed
prominence in the regulatory oversight of legal education, the accreditation
and evaluation of law schools, curricular design, and standard setting.
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1.

See Faqir Hussain, The Judicial System of Pakistan (2011), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/thejudicialsystemofPakistan.pdf [hereinafter
Judicial System of Pakistan]. Dr. Hussian is the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan
and this report was presented at the Annual Judicial Conference in Islamabad in 2011.
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The Pakistan Bar Council—the national elected organization of Pakistani
lawyers—thus occupies a role usually entrusted to autonomous law schools,
state regulators and career academics. The Higher Education Commission of
Pakistan, the apex regulatory body for university education in the country,
also claims this role. This conflict arises because two statutes were introduced
at different points in time, empowering both for this function without any
serious thought to the suitability and capacity of either for the role nor any
attempt to rationalize overlapping jurisdictions. The bar council, while largely
neglecting its primary function of regulating the legal profession, always had
the ascendant role in this confused milieu. However, jurisdictional uncertainty
largely causes neither to play any meaningful role. Even otherwise, neither the
bar council nor the education commission has developed and demonstrated
much capacity or will to address the continuing decline in legal education as
genuine stakeholders.2
Weber and the Pakistani Legal Education System
Many issues are posed by the domination of lawyers in legal education
in Pakistan. This has meant, for example, that the bent and emphasis of the
nation’s legal education primarily has been to impart a craft-like specialization.
It may be useful here briefly to examine Max Weber’s typology of professional
legal training and the various legal modes of thinking. In my view, the prevalent
manner of legal training in Pakistan can be seen as similar to, in Weber’s terms,
an “empirical training in the law as a craft; the apprentices learn from the
practitioners more or less in the course of actual legal practice.” His alternative
type of legal training occurs in “special schools, where the emphasis is placed
on legal theory and ‘science,’ that is, where legal phenomena are given rational
and systemic treatment.”3 In the Pakistani legal academy—more or less devoid
of engaged, full-time research-driven academics—lawyers largely determine
academic curricula, set standards and teach. This scenario differs little in
effect from Weber’s first type, where law is taught by the lawyers and taught
as a craft rather than as a science. Exploring Weber’s typology further, more
similarities of ethos and methodology emerge, situations in which the lawyer
has displaced the law professor. For instance, Weber characterizes his first type
as denoting a philosophy of legal training purely “empirical” and “practical,”
and that led to “specialization.”4 According to Weber:
2.

See Osama Siddique, Martial Laws and Lawyers: The Crisis of Legal Education in Pakistan
and Key Areas of Reform, 5 Regent J. Int’l L. 95 (2007) [hereinafter Martial Laws and
Lawyers]. The article conducts a historical review of various challenges and constraints
faced by legal education in Pakistan. See also Richard Blue, Richard Hoffman, Management
Systems International & Louis-Alexandre Berg, Pakistan Rule of Law Assessment—
Final Report 27–29 (2008), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO130.pdf
[hereinafter Pakistan Rule of Law Assessment].

3.

See Max Weber, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society 198 (Max Rheinstein, ed.,
Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein, trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1954) [hereinafter Max Weber].

4.

See id. at 201.
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[T]his kind of legal training naturally produced a formalistic treatment of
the law, bound by precedent and analogies drawn from precedent. Not only
was systematic and comprehensive treatment of the whole body of the law
prevented by the craft like specialization of the lawyers, but legal practice
did not aim at all at a rational system but rather a practically useful scheme
of contracts and actions, oriented towards the interests of clients in typically
recurrent situations.5

Prominent drawbacks of current law teaching in Pakistan include: the
clear vocational orientation of most lawyers and judges who teach law; their
emphasis on the practical at the cost of the theoretical and the abstract; the
absence of research-based interdisciplinary, comparative or critical thinking;
the virulent myopia toward the vital inter-linkages among politics, society,
policy and the law; and the consequent embrace of given doctrine as gospel.6
It is tempting to quote again from Weber who goes on to observe:
[W]herever legal education has been in the hands of practitioners, especially
attorneys, who have made admission to practice a guild monopoly, an
economic factor, namely, their pecuniary interest, brings to bear a strong
influence upon the process not only of stabilizing the official law and of
adapting it to changing needs in an exclusively empirical way but also of
preventing its rationalization through legislation or legal science.7

The lawyers’ stranglehold on Pakistan’s legal education system promotes
and sustains an invasion of law schools by a guild-like, mechanical approach to
training in law. One is told how, in the past, leading lawyers of the country—
practitioners in the old mold who were generalists, read widely and thought
deeply—considered it public service also to teach and were apparently inspiring
and thought-provoking teachers. That is no longer the case, as the leading
lawyers are far too busy and gainfully employed. With exceptions, those who
teach now are those with spare time. In many ways, the stranglehold of lawyers
is symptomatic of the same ethos embedded in approaches to justice-sector
reform in Pakistan, in which the “legal community”8 has played a prominent
part. As a result, the existing structure, framework and salient features of the
legal-judicial system seldom are questioned in fundamental ways.
In this context, it is poignant to quote from a typical perspective on the
nation’s legal education by a senior Pakistani lawyer. His remarks epitomize
the Pakistani legal fraternity’s attitudes toward the idea of a career legal
academy:
5.

Id.

6.

See Martial Laws and Lawyers, supra note 2, at 98–107.

7.

See Weber, supra note 3, at 202–03.

8.

I use this term to describe judges, lawyers, court staff, government policymakers and law
officials, as well as local and international policy-reform consultants.
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It may however be stated that insistence on a full time faculty is not a rational
demand of the university. Most of the subjects taught in the class rooms pertain
to laws concerning the claims of the litigants. In this situation a practicing
lawyer, with requisite experience at the bar, is a far better choice than a person
who has no nexus with the day to day problems being faced by the litigants
and issues arising in the court rooms during the trial of the case. Full time staff
being underpaid, loses interest and therefore the best alternative is to have not
more than [25] percent permanent staff in the faculty.9

At least the use of the word “faculty” in the above text is welcome for it is
novel—“teacher,” as mentioned earlier, is the word most commonly employed
for the legal academy. The words “academics,” “scholars,” and “researchers”
mostly are absent from both the lexicon as well as the imagination or denote a
career change necessitated by an indifferent time at the bar.
The Sociology of the Legal Profession
Let’s turn to a brief, necessary overview of the legal profession in Pakistan.
Despite the paramount importance of lawyers in an adversarial system
of adjudication, the Pakistani legal profession is acutely understudied.
Meaningful regulation of the legal bars also historically has been neglected.
Most Pakistani lawyers and judges now are locally trained and this results
in not just frequent resentment toward and distrust of the gradually growing
cadres of foreign-trained lawyers and even some judges but also paranoia about
any talk of reforms of legal education and the profession. These proposals at
times draw legitimate opposition as alien in origin and hence unsuitable in
the local context; more often, however, they are rejected out of parochialism,
as they seek to amend a system that the incumbents are comfortable with and
thrive in—regardless of its various inequities, inefficiencies and other costs for
its end-users.10
Hundreds of bar councils and associations exist at the tehsil (administrative
division), district, provincial and national levels. According to some estimates,
there are 89,624 lawyers now enrolled to practice in different Pakistani
courts. Of these, 43,964 are licensed to practice only in the district courts.11
9.

Syed Afzal Haider, Legal Education 10, unpublished paper, available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov.pk/ijc/Articles/6/2.pdf. It is no coincidence that this undated article is
available on the website of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The ideological affinity and
everyday nexus of a senior Supreme Court lawyer with his arena of daily activity has a direct
bearing here with the exalted access accorded to his views on legal education.

10.

For a description and discussion of the law degrees and programs in Pakistan, see Martial
Laws and Lawyers, supra note 2. Those who train in the law abroad have traditionally headed
almost exclusively to the island that once ruled this part of the world. Now the trend is
changing in favor of U.S. law schools as well as law schools in many other commonwealth
countries.

11.

Of these, 4,118 are Supreme Court advocates, 30,000 are in the High Court in Punjab,
6,840 are in the High Court in Sindh, 3,171 are in the High Court in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa,
and 1,531 are in the High Court in Baluchistan. There are 22,000; 9,214; 10,606; and 2,144
advocates in the subordinate courts in the four provinces in the same order as above. See
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The actual number of active, practicing lawyers is estimated to be lower,
as many law graduates never practice or give it up soon after fulfilling the
barely challenging requirements to earn a law degree. However, even if we
take these numbers to denote active practicing lawyers, it would be instructive
to determine per capita access to lawyers in diverse regions of the country.
Using the most conservative population statistics, for every 10,000 Pakistanis
there are six lawyers (who are enrolled to practice in all Pakistani courts) and
three district court lawyers. Further, the following are the number of enrolled
district lawyers for every 10,000 residents in the different provinces: Punjab
(2.5 lawyers); Sindh (2.75 lawyers); Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (5 lawyers); and
Baluchistan (2.5 lawyers). These low overall numbers do not reflect that within
the provinces, actual access depends on proximity to towns and cities, and that
many rural Pakistanis live in remote areas and, hence, face more challenges in
access. In comparison, the following are the number of available lawyers per
10,000 residents of different countries: United States (37 lawyers); Brazil (30.5
lawyers); New Zealand (25.5 lawyers); Spain (25 lawyers); United Kingdom (25
lawyers); Italy (20.5 lawyers); Germany (17 lawyers); and France (7 lawyers).12
Historically, the legal bars in Pakistan have been highly politicized, as
well as politically divided. Other than inadequate emphasis on professional
regulation, this also is due to the active role played by South Asian lawyers
in the years leading up to independence. Many of the most prominent
leaders of the independence struggle such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah,
Mohandas K. Gandhi, Allama Muhammad Iqbal and Jarwaharlal Nehru,
were lawyers. Further, Pakistani lawyers and lawyers-turned-politicians have
been prominent in pro-democracy movements against military dictatorships,
closely allied with political parties, and active in national politics. It is also
key to note that aspirants, while maintaining close alliances with political
Judicial System of Pakistan, supra note 1. A lesser overall figure of 81,209 lawyers is reported
in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Information on the Administration of Justice, in Annual
Report, April 2010—December 2011, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/Annual_
rpt_ap09mar10/13.pdf. The population figures for calculating these numbers come from
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan Demographic Survey 2007, available at http://www.
pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/population_satistics/publications/pds2007/complete_
report.pdf [hereinafter Pakistan Demographic Survey 2007]. It should be noted that there is
no legal professional distinction in Pakistan between solicitors and barristers, as in the U.K.,
or specialized legal bars, as in the U.S. Lawyers often are both solicitors and litigators,
unless someone chooses to engage in purely advisory work or litigation. Further, Pakistani
lawyers often practice in all areas of law except for those who develop a specialization and a
market reputation in a particular field.
12.

See Osama Siddique, Pakistan’s Experience with Formal Law: An Alien Justice 27
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2013). It should be noted that these international figures seem to
reflect the total number of enrolled lawyers, while the provincial figures provided by me for
Pakistan are only for district court lawyers. However, since district court lawyers constitute
the bulk of Pakistani lawyers and the difference between the Pakistani and the international
figures is so vast, even the addition of Pakistani appellate court lawyers to the total numbers
used for calculating these figures will not make much of a difference, as can be seen from
the Pakistani national figures for all lawyers and district court lawyers. Pakistani population
statistics have been taken from Pakistan Demographic Survey 2007, supra note 11.
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parties, have pursued successful routes to prestigious appointments to the
appellate courts that include: election to offices in legal bars; appointments
to government positions in the Attorney General’s or the provincial Advocate
Generals’ offices (which invariably are politically motivated). These rich career
incentives as well as the active street-mobilization potential of lawyers, convert
bar council elections into mini-battles between various political-ideological
factions. Further, election to bar offices is coveted not only for the political
leverage they provide but also for the public perception of clout, which, in
turn, boosts clientele for those elected.
With bar councils acting as political party strongholds or platforms for
personal career advancement, professional entrance standards and the ethical
regulation of the legal fraternity have been weak. International donor-driven
interventions for bar reforms have been regarded with great mistrust and
strongly resisted, due both to an acute paranoia stemming from Pakistan’s
experience with periodic attempts by military governments to use “reform”
as a mechanism to “tame” lawyers, as well as various vested interests within
the lawyer community. Consequently, there are no credible bar examinations;13
no continuing legal education and professional development programs;14
and lackluster internal disciplinary mechanisms.15 The constantly increasing
supply of largely ill-trained law graduates, at the same time, exerts tremendous
pressure to keep the standards for entering the legal bars low. Paradoxically,
while per capita availability of lawyers is low, the low entrance standards
expose the profession to overpopulation by lawyers lacking rudimentary skills
and competence. Their growing numbers reinforce the inertia and resistance
to raising standards. In many countries, the primary motives to maintain bar
13.

For instance, recently introduced bar examinations in Punjab fall well short of testing the
candidates’ proficiency in legal concepts and substantive procedural laws. They exclusively
focus on testing rote knowledge of some mechanical rules. Further, the pass rate of these
exams is almost 100 percent, an indictment of their rigor. The situation is similar in other
provinces. These bar exams also are of recent provenance, introduced as late as 2005 in
Punjab. Prior to that, unregulated clerkships for a period of time sufficed for obtaining the
license to practice in the district courts. Induction into the High Court and Supreme Court
bars historically has required an interview and more scrutiny of eligibility. But over the years,
lawyers of widely variable quality have managed to gain membership, not least because of
frequent changes in the ex officio judges and bar representatives entrusted with admissions
scrutiny. Standards and motivations vary greatly among these individuals.

14.

Several endeavors in 2005–06 failed to start such programs in conjunction with the
Canadian Bar Association due to lack of support by local legal bars. However, a major new
European Union funded program focusing, inter alia, on certain aspects of bar reform and
the provision of legal aid is expected to launch in the province of Punjab in early 2014.

15.

The ineffectiveness of these internal disciplinary mechanisms is a source of constant public
criticism. More recently, their laxness was exposed in incidents involving lawyers beating
journalists, police and even district court judges. Despite intense media scrutiny and public
outrage, the offenders were let off with light punishments by investigating bar disciplinary
committees. See e.g., Amir Riaz, Lawyers again rough up journalists, The Nation, Aug. 07,
2009, available at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/
Politics/07-Aug-2009/Lawyers-again-rough-up-journalists. Such inglorious incidents are on
the rise in the district courts.

Legal Education in Pakistan

505

entry standards include professional pride and a consequent commitment
to high professional and ethical standards, as well as a desire to restrict the
legal fee pie to a select few. But in Pakistan, the aforementioned political
constituency-building imperatives largely have prevailed.16 They have eroded
the space, culture and motivation for meaningful dialogue within the bars
to assess their performance and the overall quality and direction of the legal
profession.17
Especially but not exclusively at the district courts, local lawyer-bar
alliances also are structured along ethnic and occupational caste lines. For
many rural litigants, these can be significant criteria for choosing a lawyer or
their only common reference point for contacting and trusting one.18 In poor
areas with low education, lawyers often are the only educated and connected
people around, with the less privileged relying on them for favors and advice.19
Further, the legal profession is still dominated by small family firms. Sons
join or follow fathers into the profession and use the inherited office, library,
staff and clients. Bigger cities have scores of somewhat larger firms and lately
some boutique partnerships. These are set up by young foreign law graduates,
are not structured along kinship, and often offer specialized expertise. These
are primarily not profit-sharing firms with career routes for new entrants to
equity sharing partnerships along the standard U.S. large law firm model but
purely cost-sharing arrangements. They operate in the upper echelons of legal
practice (mostly corporate and commercial or high end civil, criminal and
constitutional work) and absorb a handful of the multitudes of law graduates
16.

During 2005–06, the author interviewed prominent officeholders of the Punjab Bar Council
and the Lahore High Court Bar Association. They reported that a one-year term for the
officeholders meant that successful candidates relied on votes from young law graduates
seeking admission to the bar. Further, they regarded the short stint in office as grossly
inadequate for developing a longer vision of and stake in meaningful reform. Many also
considered declining entry to the profession to any young law graduates as manifestly unjust
in a country where many found the pursuit of higher education elusive and expensive.
Stringent entry barriers, they said, were tantamount to forcing unemployment on these
candidates. There are more reasons for the rapid influx of new lawyers into the profession.
For instance, due to the low bar to entry, civil servants also start practicing law after
retirement. Further, a demonstrated aptitude for the law is not a necessary prerequisite for
entry to the profession, as students who find the going tough in other fields often take up
law as a less taxing alternative. They hope that with enough years spent making the rounds
of the courts, experience will make up for inadequacies of law school training; this prospect
never materializes for many. Their association with the profession is reduced to wearing the
standard black uniform of Pakistani lawyers, sitting around the bar rooms, and participating
in political agitation.

17.

Election canvassing during bar elections at various levels demonstrates the importance of
political and even ethnic and caste associations in such elections to the candidates’ prospects
of success.

18.

See Osama Siddique, Law in Practice—The Lahore District Courts Litigants Survey (2010–
2011) 94–95 (Development Policy Research Centre, Working Paper June 2010), available at
http://dprc.lums.edu.pk/components/com_publications/attachments/Law-In-PracticeLahore-District-Courts-Litigants-Survey.pdf.

19.

Id.
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entering the market every year. As for the vast majority of new law graduates,
they essentially join senior lawyers as low-paid apprentices or strike out on
their own and often remain brief-less for years. The development of law firms
and creation of in-house positions in the public and private sectors have not
kept pace. Young lawyers report lessening exposure to training by senior
lawyers as the professional market grows ever more saturated.20
Institutional Friction and Abandoned Reform
After surveying the state of the Pakistani legal education system, the
sociology of its legal bars and the hegemonic control over their operations by
lawyers, let’s briefly examine some recent attempts to reform legal education
in Pakistan. The most significant opportunity for this was created at the
beginning of the last decade as part of a $350-million (U.S.) soft loan from the
Asian Development Bank for justice-sector reform in Pakistan under its “Access
to Justice Program.” The program acknowledged that the quality of legal
education has a direct impact on the capacity to absorb new ideas; the worth
of judges, legal practitioners, legal research and policy-making; citizens’ legal
awareness and empowerment; and the depth and sustainability of academic,
policy and democratic discourses. The program accordingly put forward three
policy goals for legal education including, the establishment of centers of
excellence in legal education; establishment of a window in the “Access to
Justice Development Fund” to support innovations in legal education;21 and,
finally, actual establishment of the proposed centers of excellence.22
To its credit, instead of beating about the bush, the program categorically
embraced the historic neglect of legal education in Pakistan and failure of past
reforms owing to multiple factors. These factors included, unclear regulatory
arrangements and overlapping regulatory jurisdictions and absence of genuine
institutional stakeholders; low bars of entry to law schools and the paucity of
new and dynamic law schools; outdated legal curricula; inadequate teaching
pedagogy; a dearth of full-time, research-focused academics with consequent
reliance by law colleges on part-time faculties; lack of financial and other career
incentives for the legal academy; inadequate infrastructure and facilities;
20.

This description is based on the author’s experience conducting research on legal education
and bar reforms in Pakistan since 2005, which has involved regular interaction with various
legal bars and law colleges/faculties.

21.

The access program required the establishment of an “Access to Justice Development
Fund” to provide additional funds to the judiciary, as part of its broader policy imperative
of increasing overall funding for the Pakistani judiciary and introducing modern budgeting
methodology.

22.

The first policy action was linked to the release of the first segment of the access program loan.
Actual implementation was deferred to the third and last segments, though legal education
reform should have been taken up as a priority from the very start. This is both because it
is difficult and time-consuming and because of its fundamental importance to overall and
sustainable improvement in the justice sector. See Syed Ali Murtaza & Osama Siddique, The
Retrospective Report: Mapping and Assessment of Justice Sector Interventions, Donors
and Government, 1998–2010 (The Asia Foundation 2010) (on file with the author).
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unsatisfactory law school governance; a near absence of a research culture and
legal textbooks and treatises; and less-than-appreciative social and cultural
attitudes toward a career in the academy.23 The program also acknowledged that
the legal bars had more or less usurped a central role in the governance of legal
education when they ought to have concentrated instead on continuing legal
education, and regular and stringent bar examinations and exam curricula.
Furthermore, the program was fully mindful that the education commission
had neither displayed the will nor the capacity to perform its necessary role in
legal education regulation and reform.24
Leaders in the access program vetted potential supervising institutions
for the centers of excellence. These included, the Federal Judicial Academy,
the main training academy for the country’s judges that several provincial
academies since have followed and all of which remain largely dysfunctional;25
the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, a federal government institution
operating under supervision of the Supreme Court with multiple research,
advisory and recommendatory functions pertaining to law reform; and the
higher education commission. Though all were found to lack the requisite
capacity and experience, the commission eventually was selected as it showed
the most interest in the initiative and because of its official mandate as the
regulatory authority for all higher education institutions. The commission also
agreed to invest some of its own funds in this initiative. The Lahore University
of Management Sciences (LUMS)—a private, nonprofit university established
in 1985—also agreed to lend assistance as a possible role model since it had
recently introduced a new and much improved legal curriculum for a fiveyear B.A.-LL.B. degree. Further, the university had demonstrated an initial
commitment to develop a full-time research faculty, improve pedagogical
and examination approaches, and create an institutional structure for legal
education in line with international best practices.
However, there could not be a greater contrast between the official
reporting of successful compliance with the reform goals and the actual failure
of reform, as reflected in the access program’s hastily aborted forays into the
reform of legal education in Pakistan.26 To date, none of the proposed centers
of excellence has been established and there seems no likelihood any will
23.

See Martial Laws and Lawyers, supra note 2, at 100–15.

24.

See id. at 109–15.

25.

See Osama Siddique, Report on Training Needs for Judges and Court Staff (USAID 2010)
(on file with the author). This report details the sorry state of the one federal and four
provincial judicial training academies, based on interviews with district judges and the
administrative and academic managers and staff of the judicial academies; a close review
of their annual calendars and past course offerings as well as their respective curricula and
syllabi; and a qualitative assessment of their respective faculties, teaching and examination
methods and other related aspects. See also Osama Siddique, Pakistan’s Experience with
Formal Law: An Alien Justice 398–409 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).

26.

For a detailed critical discussion of different historical reform approaches in Pakistan and
their outcomes, see Osama Siddique, Pakistan’s Experience with Formal Law: An Alien
Justice (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
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be in the foreseeable future.27 The fund for “innovations in legal education”
also remains untapped.28 The failure to create the centers offers a classic
demonstration of superficial donor commitment to what actually are difficult
“soft” reforms. The program simply backed off when faced with entrenched
institutional and personal rivalries, lack of public concern and the absence of
a push for educational reform. In brief, the education commission developed
serious differences with the Ministry of Law on administrative and operational
matters—quite apart from ego battles between key personnel. A change of
leadership in the access program’s management unit caused it to fall short
in helping resolve conflicts between the education commission and the law
ministry. Meanwhile, the bar council stayed aloof from this initiative—and even
turned hostile toward the access program because of its earlier, limited and
fruitless effort to woo the legal fraternity to its vision of bar reforms. The bar
leadership felt that the access program largely ignored them. The education
commission also did not develop its institutional capacity to push the centers
of excellence initiative. Although contracts to hire external legal education
specialists were drafted, no one was ever hired as the stalemate festered
between the education commission and the law ministry. After its brief flash of
initial exuberance, the access program’s staff fairly soon decided to move on.
It subsequently made some attempts to revive the project but the momentum
was lost and the sorry state of legal education in the country persists.
Subsequently, in 2006, the education commission decided to venture on
its own and set up a national law university. It initially was to have three
campuses, in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore, and eventually two more
campuses, in Peshawar and Quetta.29 Some premises were rented for the
campuses, initial staff were hired, policies were developed, some books and
furniture were procured and faculty candidates were interviewed. But the
27.

The access program initially earmarked $5 million (U.S.) to create the centers of excellence
in legal education. They were to (a) identify the most promising public and private law
colleges for further capacity building and technical investment; (b) create an evaluation
system for assessing the initial needs of these institutions and address them through
strategic, regular investments in faculty building, curricular development, pedagogical and
evaluative systems improvement, enhanced research capacity, and improved library and
electronic research facilities; and (c) conduct regular qualitative evaluation of these selected
institutions and review their performance through an independent accreditation system
housed in a suitable Pakistani institution and assisted by international and regional legal
education experts. Non-performing institutions then were supposed to be closed after a
three-year period of sustained investment and evaluation, while good performers were to be
assisted to retain their gains and upgraded accreditation.

28.

Between 2004 and 2008, the author was directly involved with the design of the centers of
excellence project and its implementation plan as a consultant to the Asian Development
Bank. He subsequently also advised the education commission when the idea of setting up
the centers was in play. He met multiple times and negotiated with the judicial leadership,
the education commission, the Pakistan Bar Council, legal academics, leading lawyers, and
various relevant departments, including the Federal Judicial Academy, the law ministry, and
the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan.

29.

See Ahmad Ali Khan, Strengthening Legal Education: Role of Higher Education
Commission and Bar Councils (2012) (on file with the author).
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national law school project also foundered due to fractious relations among
institutional stakeholders in Pakistan in general and entrenched opposition by
bar council members in particular.30
The latest effort to somehow conjure a center of excellence is to upgrade
the highly incapacitated federal judicial academy to the status of a National
University of Law and Judicial Administration. The education commission has
approved its draft charter and a “No Objection Certificate” has been issued.
The charter has been sent to the law ministry for its scrutiny. Quite predictably,
while no one has said anything about the intellectual and academic dimensions
of the project, work on its infrastructure apparently is in full-swing. It appears
that at least enhanced infrastructure (though the academy already possesses
ample, unused built space) will exist by the middle of 2014.
Conclusions
In the discourse over Pakistan’s decade and a half long efforts at legal
education reform, certain key characteristics and developments stand out.
First, the process has been dominated by lawyers through the bar council
and now increasingly by the judges through the law and justice commission.
Neither the lawyers nor the judges, however, possess sufficient expertise or
time to comprehensively visualize what quality legal education entails. At
times, parochial politics, changing leadership, interests vested in maintaining
the status-quo vis-à-vis existing public and private law colleges, and a
propensity to allow institutional and personal clashes to grow and fester also
have not helped the cause. Second, while the education commission fixated
initially on promoting the cause of natural sciences and showed little interest
in the social sciences, when it eventually decided to push reform in the latter,
particularly in legal education, it neither had the capacity nor the leverage to
lead. Further, after the Eighteenth Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution
in 2010, the commission now has been more or less defanged as regulatory
power in higher education has devolved to the provinces, which, in turn,
has ushered in a period of acute uncertainty as to future directions of higher
education in Pakistan. Third, projects for wholesale reform in legal education
seem to be imagined either as big bang creations of centers of excellence and
national law universities, rising magically out of the existing morass, or in
accelerated metamorphosis of crumbling, existing institutional edifices like
the federal judicial academy.
Though there is token attention to the “human resource” dimension,
ultimately there is little deeper appreciation that it is the quality of the
people and an academic ethos and supporting culture that builds and
define institutions of legal education. Because the bar council, the education
commission, the law and justice commission and the judicial academy all lack
real, resident and dedicated expertise in legal education, the reforms they have
30.
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backed are unrealistic. How to identify, attract, nurture, incentivize and retain
high quality faculty invariably is least important in their imaginings; instead
they focus on procuring furniture, renting premises, acquiring real estate
and building infrastructure. This malaise also has migrated to the private
sector. Promising institutions like LUMS31 display an upstart’s fascination
for new buildings and facilities rather than substantive educational reform.
Solid advocates for quality legal education who are dedicated academics
were and remain few and far between; they largely are overlooked and remain
un-consulted in the discourse on national reform in legal education. Mere
silhouettes against the luminous backdrop of any new and grandiose blueprint
for action, they are expected to migrate like indentured laborers to whichever
new initiatives catch the fancy of the so-called reformers.
In this context, it is worth noting that there are many similarities between
the early and continuing problems, constraints, foibles and attitudes that
have inhibited improvements to legal education in India and Pakistan. But
India, after some false starts, arguably made a crucial departure by creating the
national law schools.32 That experience brought about many telling changes
in perspective and emphasis in the discourse on Indian legal education. It
triggered a virtuous circle of sorts that continues. There is a related and rich
debate on what the national law school experiment has achieved and where
it has faltered. It has generated a culture of sustained, high quality local
research. It successfully persuaded some of India’s best graduates to forego
lucrative corporate careers to pursue instead lives in public-minded litigation
for worthy causes and in the Indian legal academy. That academy largely
continues to offer the unattractive combination of bureaucratic inertia and
low salaries.33 But the national law school endeavor decisively changed Indian
legal education, its methods and thinking, in notable and praiseworthy ways.34
From my perspective, a distinct feature that has accorded continuing success
and longevity to this experiment is that, in substantial part, the change emerged
organically and incrementally from the visions, ideas, travails and tribulations
of those who have lived and breathed legal education in India. I clearly speak
here of the Indian academics and not of sundry lawyers and judges who like
to pontificate about legal education over their afternoon cups of tea after the
31.
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“more important business of the day” is out of the way. This reform occurred
because of academic visionaries embedded, operating and striving within the
Indian legal education system and thinking deeply about it. These include
pioneers like Upendra Baxi and academic leaders like N.R. Madhav Menon
with track records of illustrious confrontations with institutional inertia. They
have energized other like-minded peers as well as a promising crop of younger
scholars, leaving an indelible imprint on the choice of the path taken by Indian
legal education to recovery.35 It is crucial that they stepped up when they did
to steer Indian legal education out of the wilderness that it had once shared
with its neighbor. India has not advanced to where it needs to be. Still, with
necessary and meaningful modifications, the Indian reform model is much
more relevant for Pakistan than any alien transplant or than the top-down,
whimsical prescriptions of local judges and lawyers. It is definitely the former
that Pakistan’s already thin and fast disappearing population of legal scholars
must scrutinize.
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It has been argued persuasively that although the early Indian experience with foreign
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